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Abstract 
Climate change mitigation and dealing with ecological catastrophes is one of the hottest 
topics in modern global politics. There’s a wide acceptance that these problems are man-made, 
but a lingering political stalemate and expectations for economic growth, have not helped the 
cause to reduce greenhouse gas’ (GHG) emissions. Since the energy sector is the biggest 
emitter, states and international organisations are increasingly investing in renewable energy 
sources (RES) with an expectation that it will soon replace fossil-fuel origin sources from 
economies’ energy portfolios. Consequently, renewables, with their pros and cons, have started 
to get the attention of critics, who blame the RES sector for being no different to any other 
capitalistic industry, thus always looking to expand without achieving any of the ambitious 
global sustainability standards. 
The main aim of this paper is not only to refute such criticism, but to reveal that a share of 
renewable energy in a states’ total primary energy supply (TPES), is not only helping to fight 
against the climate change, but also brings additional value to the economy. To prove the thesis 
is correct, the author conducted a series of Pearson’s r and Spearman’s ρ correlation tests 
between the independent variable (RES/TPES) and the dependent economic variables of GDP, 
energy intensity (EI) and adjusted net worth (ANS). 
The results revealed that an increase in renewables in the energy sector mostly does not affect 
the GDP, but when correlated against an economic indicator that on some scale makes 
distinctions between environmentally harmful and harmless economic activities, e.g. ANS, then 
the test results proved, that increases in renewables add value to the economy without 
unsustainably expanding it. The results of this thesis also highlight how the developed and 
developing countries are differently affected by RES implementation. 
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Introduction 
With the number of UN’s COP (Conference of the Parties) climate mitigation talks now 
counting 25, and environmental catastrophes all across the globe becoming a normality, climate 
change has become the biggest and the most covered global issue of the 21st century. Despite 
all of that, the gulf between scientists’ warnings of an impending global catastrophe and the 
political and economic will to avoid such a fate, remains large (Harris, 2013). Although there’s 
high diplomatic activity around the topic, the real situation resembles more of the ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ – actions, that benefit an individual, but harm the community -, than a solution 
to the continuous increase of greenhouse gas’ (GHG) emissions, which is the main cause of 
global warming. 
The main contributors of the GHGs emissions are the energy and transport sectors, which have 
traditionally relied on energy extracted from fossil-fuels (IRENA, 2017b). Considering the facts 
that (a) the dependency of fossil fuels is even higher amongst the developing economies, which 
energy needs are growing faster than in the developed world; (b) we have not reached ‘peak 
oil’, yet, which would force humanity to consume less; and (c) the capitalistic economy by its 
nature always seeks to expand (Antolick, 2002), then it appears that humanity’s only remaining 
option is to seek for a cleaner and more effective way to generate energy. In other words, in 
order to decrease energy intensity, which measures how much energy is consumed to produce 
a unit of economic output (OECD, 2019), or to invest more in renewable energy sources (RES) 
(EC, 2012). 
Renewable energy sources are the main subject of this paper. Its technology has developed 
exponentially, making it today affordable, even to the least developed economies (IRENA, 
2019b) and proving to be efficient enough, in the example of Scotland, Sweden and Denmark, 
to take over the majority of those countries energy portfolios from the domineering 
conventional energy sources, like coal-fired power plants and oil etc. The main aim of this 
thesis is to go a step further, and observe, if renewable energy sources’ increase in a country’s 
energy portfolio also adds value to modern economies. 
The theoretical background of this thesis is covered between chapters 1.1 to 1.5, which were 
divided into two parts: RES and the economy. The first three chapters will offer an overview 
of all the factors to be considered about renewable energy sources (RES). Chapter 1.1 is an 
introduction to RES. It gives background information on the increasing influence the RES’ 
industry has on modern policy and explains shortly, how renewables can be used regarding 
climate change mitigation. The same chapter will also introduce the advantages and 
disadvantages of the major renewable energy sources. Chapter 1.2 supports the thesis of this 
paper by introducing theories of how an increased share of renewables could be beneficial for 
the economy. On the contrary, chapter 1.3 adds value to the thesis by offering critical 
perspective on the RES industry. 
The second half of the theoretical part brings the subject of this thesis, economic growth, to a 
modern context. Chapter 1.4 introduces Peter Victor’s (2010) theory of green growth economy, 
where greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) become an important indicator in measuring the 
success of the modern economies that have to deal with climate change mitigation. Finishing 
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the theoretical part, chapter 1.5 is a short criticism of GDP. The chapter focuses on ideas 
supporting the modification of the GDP indicator, so that it would reflect more on present 
environmental requirements (Harris, 2010). 
To support the main aim of this thesis, the method that the author chose for this research, focuses 
on correlation tests based on Pearson’s r and Spearman’s ρ coefficients between an independent 
variable representing the share of renewables in the total energy supply (RES/TPES) from one, 
and multiple economic aggregates, including GDP, on the other side. These correlation tests 
were conducted on sample frames consisting of both, the developed and the developing 
economies of the World, with a purpose to discover how does renewable industry’s effect 
variate between economies from different development stages. Chapters 2.1 and 2.2 will 
explain in depth the choice of indicators and the overall methodology of this research. 
The thesis commences with empirical analysis. Chapter 3.1 offers an opportunity to study the 
selected sample frame of countries with the aid of Victor’s (2010) green growth economy 
theory. The purpose of this part is to offer analytical perspective for the following chapters. 
Chapters 3.2 to 3.4 will reveal the results of the 96 different correlation tests conducted between 
the variables. These paragraphs explain, with multiple graphs, how and in what manner 
renewable energy could be affecting different dependent variables, like gross domestic product 
(GDP), energy intensity (EI) and adjusted net savings (ANS). This part of the thesis will be 
brought together by a conclusion, which highlights the main findings of the empirical analysis 
and offers a critical review on the completed research. 
 
1. Theoretical context 
1.1 Renewable Energy Sources (RES) & the Policy 
In order to limit the temperature increase on Earth below 1.5-2°C compared to pre-
industrial levels, the global community has partially agreed, in the form of agreements like the 
Kyoto Protocol (2005) and the Paris agreement (2015) etc., on mutual emission(s) reduction 
commitments and other similar action plans. European Union, a frontrunner in that matter, has 
set a target to reduce greenhouse gas emission by 85% by 2050. The main motivation for the 
union has not only been the environment, but also its economic sustainability. The EU is rather 
convinced that a low carbon future under any scenario is cheaper for Europe than continuing a 
fossil-fuel dependent system (European Union, 2010).  
Other major international organisations like the United Nation and the OECD are also involved, 
where, for example the latter provides its member states a transparent arena for discussions and 
exchanging knowledge, helps governments with policy alignment and mitigation strategies, 
provides governments expertise to prepare for prognosticated climate change related issues, etc. 
(OECD, 2016). 
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The target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the global enforcement of the green 
economy, defined as “improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly 
reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities” (UNEP, 2011), are believed to be 
accomplished via green investments in multiple ways. Options can range from energy 
efficiency, technology of renewable energy, pollution abatement and materials recycling, 
natural-resources conservation and ecological restoration to environmental compliance, 
education, training, and also public awareness (Barbier, 2016).  
Since the wider global acceptance of man-made climate change, renewable energy sources 
(RES) have received most of the publicity amongst all the other options. RES are generally 
believed to satisfy our increasing demand for energy and solve the biggest piece (in EU 29.2% 
of GHG are created by the energy sector (EEA, 2019)) in the fight with reducing CO² emissions 
and maintaining environmental quality. 
To break RES down, the European Commission is using the following classification based on 
type of consumption/usage:  
(1) RES-Electricity (E) - electricity produced by RES;  
(2) RES-Heat (H) - heat generated from burning RES (eg. wood etc.), and utilizing technologies 
like solar thermal, geothermal; 
(3) RES-Transport (T): RES-based transportation fuels like biodiesel etc.  
(European Commission, 2014)       
Main RES are hydro, wind and solar energy, every one of them a coin with two sides. They 
have proved to be technologies with high potential to satisfy World’s future energy need, but 
they also bring with them, one more than another, high costs, limits and sacrificies. 
The oldest and the most cost-effective of RES technologies is hydropower. It is mainly 
harnessed by turning rivers into large water reservoirs that generate electricity with the help of 
gravity forcing the water flow downstream through a turbine. Hydropower can be produced 
everywhere across the world where there is water moving, and because of the simplicity of the 
solution, water dams today decorate states’ infrastructure everywhere we go, limiting the 
potential of that part of the RES sector to grow. Due to the maturity of the technology, the 
potential of growth for hydroenergy has proven to be limited: only 2.96% annual growth 
between 2010-2016 and an estimated decrease in total global share of RES-E from 18% in 2016 
down to 11% by 2050 (IRENA, 2020). Another downside of hydroenergy is that since its source 
is unmovable, it can not be used for RES-H and RES-T. 
Wind energy, in contrast to hydroenergy, can be produced in many more locations – a wind 
turbine can basically be set up wherever there is wind. Since 2000, with the help of 
technological progress and government incentive programmes, wind turbine electricity 
generation has increased by more than 30 times (IRENA, 2019). In 2018, all wind turbines 
installed across the world covered up to 6% of RES-E and growing (WWEA, 2019). On the 
down side, there are challenges with the technology. First of all, wind is renewable, but the 
turbines are not, because they are mainly produced in fossil-fuel-dominated Asia. More radical 
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environmentalists do even argue that wind power is merely a fossil-fuel hybrid (Zehner, 2012). 
Secondly, wind power is very intermittent – it often supplies electricity when there is no 
demand, creating surplus that is exported for a bargain price (Zehner, 2012). Finally, similarly 
to hydro, wind power can be utilised only to produce electricity, it does not help directly with 
providing energy to RES-T and RES-H sectors. 
Solar photovoltaics (PV) is the youngest of the three main RES technologies, but is the one 
with the highest potential. 2010-2016 solar PVs capacity increased annually by 47.5% and its 
share in total electricity supply is estimated to grow from 1% in 2016 to 14-25% by 2050 
(IRENA, 2019). Solar PV panels are not affordable for everybody, but the technology’s high 
potential comes from the possibility to convert sunlight into direct current electricity 
everywhere on the planet. Due to this kind of a flexibility and mobility, the technology is also 
already used for RES-H and has the potential to be directly used for RES-T. From the other 
hand, solar power, similar to wind power, is also intermittent – without storage option, the 
energy generated can be used only during the daylight. Furthermore, the fast growth of solar 
PV was artificially caused by government subsidies. Without supporting funds, the technology 
has proved to be too expensive to sell alone. This is illustrated well by the fact that in 2015 
cloudy Germany generated three times more solar electricity than sunny Spain (Smil, 2017). 
Other RES technologies are biomass, hydrogen, ethanol/biodiesel and more. 
The most effective renewable-energy infrastructure would combine solar and wind, along with 
geothermal, hydro and clean bioenergy as supplemental sources. (Pollin, 2018) 
 
1.2  Renewable Energy’s positive effect on the economy 
 Increased global awareness of man-made climate change has altered the way of thinking 
about the continuation of societies’ welfare and economic growth. This is fertile ground for the 
rise of new ideas and ideologies on how to run the economic system. For example, there’s a 
spread of ecologism, which prioritises nature and the planet over humans, viewing the latter as 
a servant of the former. Also, wide popularity has gathered ecosocialism that sees the 
destruction of the natural environment as a characteristic trait of capitalism, and like socialism, 
it forecasts a revolution for the capitalistic regime. On the other hand, there are aspirations that 
occurring global environmental problems can be solved with a ‘green’ addition or a 
modification of the capitalistic economy – establishing a “green economy”. That means a low-
carbon economy or a sector of the economy that “produces goods and services with an 
environmental benefit” (Muro et. al., 2011). 
Renewable energy is expected to have a major part in the proposed green economy. As a matter 
of fact, the European Commission has seen RES as “a major player in the European energy 
market” for some time. EC does not only view RES as a way to diversify their energy supply 
and decrease GHG emissions, but they see it also as a solution to create new industries, jobs 
and export opportunities, thus providing economic growth. (EC, 2012) 
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Following is a list of means on how RES benefits the economy. Firstly, recent reports 
reveal that the average costs of generating electricity with RES is now roughly equal with fossil 
fuels (IRENA, 2019b, Pollin, 2018). And when the environmental costs of burning fossil-fuels 
are also taken into consideration, then renewables have already become cheaper (Pollin, 2018), 
giving the economies an opportunity to fulfill their energy requirements at a reduced price. 
Secondly, and also related to energy, it has been widely claimed that RES’ technologies 
help to decrease energy intensity (EI), which is an indicator showing how much energy is spent 
to produce one unit of economic output. To simplify, the lower the EI, the less energy is spent 
for value creation in the economy. A positive correlation between a decreasing EI and growth 
of GDP has been the outcome of numerous studies (Smil, 2017; Bartoletto, 2012). Furthermore, 
conducted researches have also highlighted that RES, by increasing energy efficiency, is having 
a positive effect on EI (IRENA, 2017). This carries out in two simultaneous ways. On one hand, 
EI’s value lowers because the efficiency of final conversions of RES is superior to conventional 
power sources (Smil, 2017; IRENA, 2017). This is because RES has no fuel input, which 
removes the need for thermal conversion that would have amounted to a loss of energy.  
On the other hand, since energy generation from RES is more efficient than burning fossil-
fuels, it does reduce the amount of TPES (Total Primary Energy Supply). That is because RES 
replaces non-renewable sources with lower efficiency in EI’s equation. Overall IRENA 
(International Renewable Energy Agency, 2017) claims that RES accounts for 20-30% of total 
present day EI improvements. (IRENA, 2017) 
Thirdly, RES sector provides new employment opportunities, with numbers of people 
employed in the RES sector increasingly rising, even in coal-friendly major economies like the 
USA and China (IRENA, 2019c). It has been also claimed that jobs in the RES sector provide 
a better working environment (e.g. working outdoors) and require a higher skillset than 
conventional energy sectors (Muro et. al., 2011). These are qualities that normally go hand-in-
hand with higher salaries, which translate into an increase in total GDP. 
RES contributes significant amounts of funds in total new investments. By a recent 
report by UNEP (2019), global investements in renewable industry (excl. hydro energy) 
amounted to $2.6 trillion USD during the last decade (2010-2019), which is three times more 
compared to 2000-2009. The reasons behind these investments is the continuous technological 
race which, as has been historically proven (Heaton et. al., 1991), contributes to the expansion 
of wealth and productivity of the economy. This kind of a competition will not be harmful to a 
green economy’s perspectives, if it parallelly, with economic growth, also brings merits to 
sustainability targets (Heaton et. al., 1991). 
 A good example to conclude this section and bring together the economic factors 
highlighted above, is the analysis done by A. Blinder (2010) and M. Zandi, who compared the 
US’s and the EU’s fiscal policy actions during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. They discovered 
that US’s aggressive fiscal policy, which also included large portions of green investments, 
most likely held off a much gloomier outcome and returned it to economic growth relatively 
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quickly. But its peer, the EU, chose a much stringent fiscal policy for RES and other segments, 
which could be one of the main causes of ongoing economic slowdown in many of its member 
countries. 
1.3  Criticism of RES policies 
During the first couple of decades of RES implementation, production and consumption 
has revealed to us the technologies’ deficiences and subsequent shortcomings. With criticisms 
from both sides - from environmentalists and obviously from the stakeholders who would prefer 
the status quo. Criticism from stakeholders, that is people and companies who own shares and 
have interests for the the continuation and success of fossil burning industries, does not come 
to many as a surprise. However, criticism from environmentalists and such towards an emerging 
alternative energy industry that is supposed to help tackle the same ecological issues that they 
advocate, is a growing trend that should not be left aside when researching how these new 
technologies affect the socio-economic space in our societies. 
Firstly, environmentalists argue that RES will be insufficient to produce all the energy humanity 
needs. They point out that the data from the past decades about RES technologies’ speedy 
improvement can’t be extrapolated forecasting the future, which has often been optimistically 
done for different reasons. Since the gradual improvement of these technologies has largely 
plateaued, it’s false to suppose and promote that the technology will improve with the same 
tempo it has for the last few decades. The Moore’s Law, outcome doubles while costs decrease, 
does not apply here. (Zehner, 2012) 
Furthermore, just producing more alternative energy will expand energy supplies, which 
decreases the price of energy, encourages people to consume more, and finally brings us right 
back to where we started – lack of supply and increasing demand of energy. A phenomen termed 
the rebound-effect (Aydin-Kok-Brounen, 2017; Khazzoom, 1980). The United States example 
shows how the same scenario played out with subsidized nuclear power: More nuclear power 
plants were supposed to satisfy country’s electricity demand forever, but to the contrary, it 
increased demand, which translated into the building of more coal-fired power plants (Zehner, 
2012). Overall, environmentalists argue that cleaner energy means less energy. 
Secondly, ecologists argue that a RES economy is no different from a fossil burning economy. 
Since economic systems worldwide reward the commoditization of knowledge and resources 
for profit, there’s no need to presume it to be any different with energy produced from RES 
(Zehner, 2012). The standard operating procedure that has worked like a well-oiled machine 
for the main stakeholders in the energy sector will continue to run with no big differences, with 
productivist’s leanings to push through legislation that suits them and expand production and 
profits (Zehner, 2012) 
Thirdly, environmentalists feel that the presented ‘pit fights’ between RES and fossil fuel 
energy in the media, in the public and private sector have blinded the society by taking attention 
away from the real issues and other alternative solutions available to deal with ecological crisis 
and social welfare. These fights have delivered an illusion that an increase in renewable energy 
production will correspondingly diminish the need for fossil-fuel resources. The main criticism 
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they have is that the decision makers of society and society itself compares production against 
production and believe that increasing amount of ecological and economical problems waiting 
us ahead can be beaten with upgraded technology and growing production of energy. (Zehner, 
2012)  
And finally, environmentalists find that the real fundamental weakness of the RES projects is 
that they do not deal with the real sources of our problems such as consumerism, capitalism, 
walkable neighbourhoods, energy conservation and more. Energy production is preferred over 
energy reduction and conservation, because constructing better insulation for buildings, 
creating walkable neighbourhoods and living a more minimalistic life is not exciting and will 
not create jobs. (Zehner, 2012) In other words, these solutions bring less profitable opportunities 
for the capitalistic system. 
Taking all of the claims above into consideration, when researching how RES affects the 
economy, a couple things must be taken into account: 
1. Increasing the share of RES in a country’s energy portfolio could have a negative effect 
on GDP and indicators similar because of the artificial nature of how the sector is 
subsidised and the continuing damage the sector does to the environment. 
2. Since there’s a hinted cap on GDP – economies can’t grow exponentionally in an 
isolated system like our planet -, alternative indicators to measure the well-being of our 
economies and societies should be considered when looking for a more precise result 
on what kind of effect RES’ sector truly brings. 
 
1.4 Economic Growth, Degrowth & “Green Growth” 
A general economical forecast is that growth-obsessed industrialisation will intensify. Even 
most of the economists have been too long attached to an unrealistic view that perpetual growth 
is necessary and also possible to achieve. Neo liberal economies have an inbuilt cycle of lending 
and printing money and drilling holes into earth, in order to keep the elite and the voters 
satisfied. This is a necessity to maintain order and power in such states. Resulting in the notion 
that the economy must always expand and reducing the environment to a ‘standing reserve’ for 
unending economic growth (Antolick, 2002).  
As most of the scientists and ecologists have by now discovered, societies’ ambitious 
endeavours have reached physical fundamental barriers to ongoing economic expansion. Proofs 
of ecological crises, diminution of finite resources is met on every continent. Realization has 
arrived that economic growth as we have known is over (Heinberg, 2011). And since it’s not 
realistic to grow our economy forever, we can’t rely on growth to pay down our debt, both to 
banks and the environment. 
It is advised to reconceptualize economic growth. “Either a different type of growth, or an 
adaptation to a lower or no-growth economy, is necessary” (Harris, 2013). Because, as Robert 
Solow explained 50 years ago, there is nothing that says that economic growth is a natural and 
unremovable particle of a capitalistic system (Solow, 1970). 
12 
 
Ecological economists have developed new strategies of economical growth with less impact 
on the environment. Peter A. Victor divides states into categories based on their track record in 
GDP growth and its relation to total greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) emitted, where the 
growth rate of GDP of a state is compared to the growth rate of GHG intensity (GHG/GDP). In 
short, these categories are ’green growth’, ‘brown growth’, ‘black growth’ and ‘green 
degrowth’ (Victor, 2010). 
Victor labels countries with the term ’green growth’, where there is improvement in both GDP 
and GHG intensity, but the rate of reduction in the latter is bigger than the rate of growth in the 
former. In this category a few of the present day well-developed European countries may 
belong. A country is in a ‘brown growth’ category when the rate of reduction in GHG intensity 
is less than the rate of its increase in GDP. Opposite to ‘green growth’, the environmental impact 
in ‘brown growth’ increases with every dollar made in the economy. As the analyses in this 
paper will disclose later, most of the modern age developed and developing countries fall into 
this category. Going down the ladder, there’s ‘black growth’, which consists of countries with 
economical growth and a rise in GHG intensity. And finally, there’s also a possibility for a 
‘green degrowth’ economy, where the size of GDP shrinks together with GHG emissions. 
(Victor, 2010). 
With the importance of environmental politics sharply rising in the European Union (EU) and 
a large part of the continent struggling to find economical growth after the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, it is becoming increasingly realistic to find examples of ‘green degrowth’ economies. 
Many developed Western European countries have struggled to bounce their economies back 
towards growth, while at the same time exemplarily legislating new environmental laws and 
conducting subsidy programs for RES technology investment and implementation. Differently 
to the opinion of the leaders of some of the developed countries, who have involuntarily found 
themselves in the cluster of ‘green degrowth’, ecologists suggest that the situation is anticipated 
and justify their thesis of degrowth: “growth is uneconomic and unjust…it is ecologically 
unsustainable and that it will never be enough” (D’Alisa, Demaria, Kallis, 2015). 
Political campaign slogans and a small number of seats in an average contemporary parliament 
(Grant-Tilley, 2019) show that green parties are not very popular amongst its people. In fact, 
what is popular, is the thought that ecologism as an ideology proves to be democratically 
impossible, since an anti-growth message is unattractive to voters (Heywood, 2007). The people 
want employment, social security, prosperity amongst many things and generally they prioritize 
short-term needs over long-term ones, with ecological reasoning lagging behind or getting more 
attention only once mundane needs are satisfied (Grant-Tilley, 2019). Add in increasing 
international pressure and competition that degrowth politics would bring to a government of 
any state, and it looks like the ideology of degrowth is better to be shelved, waiting for a time 
of complete ecological catastrophe or similar. 
Fortunately, there are less radical, and at the same time more viable and ecologically sustainable 
economic growth solutions available. In a paper written in 1993 by H.Daly, defining the 
economy as an open subsystem in a closed ecosystem (total system), the idea of a steady-state 
macroeconomics was introduced into the modern economics conversation. He states that since 
the earth grows qualitatively, but there’s no new material entering the total system, the modern 
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economy, being an inseparable part of the system, needs to move away from quantitative growth 
to qualitative, achieving equilibrium with its environment. Beyond an optimal point ecological 
costs will start growing faster than profit and instead of promised prosperity will make humanity 
poorer. Therefore, economy must find a steady state in a closed system. A state that satisfies 
the needs of a society, but doesn’t pollute beyond the environment’s absorptive capacity. (Daly, 
1993) 
In RES context, a move towards steady-state could be made with ‘green growth’ via a strategy 
called ‘decoupling’ – in other words, removing energy use (fossil-fuel consumption) from the 
economic growth process (and its’ indicators) (Harris, 2017 & Pollin, 2018). Decoupling can 
theoretically be achieved through greater energy efficiency and RES supply systems, which 
decreases the emitted amount of GHG, while still benefitting from economic growth. The goal 
is to use less energy to achieve the same results. Further case is made that when the composition 
of GDP, which most governments trust as the main measure for economic success, “changes in 
favor of services and away from goods, GDP can rise with the same or even less impact on the 
environment” (Victor, 2010).  
1.5 Alternatives to Measure the Economy 
Political and economical solutions for manifestation of the ideas discussed could be 
found from the works of John Maynard Keynes, who, in an effort to understand and solve the 
Great Depression in 1930s, became well known for his works on economic reforms. Without 
going into historic details, it is widely agreed that the capitalistic economy owes much to 
Keynes for bringing it out from its collapse and for its continuing growth up until to present 
day. One of the central ideas of Keynesian economics is ‘Keynesian Compromise’ – right 
degree and nature of state intervention within an overall system of open markets (Balaam, 
1996). Although Keynes did believe in the positive force of the market, he saw the need for 
state involvement where numerous rational individual choices could most likely produce 
irrational collective outcomes. A tenet being that government intervention can stabilize the 
economy. 
What a true Keynesian view shares in common with ecological perspective is the refusal of 
market optimality assumed in classical economic models. Mainstream economic theories’ 
assumption of a self-regulating economic system makes it essentially impossible to deal with 
issues like the need for a major energy transition, environmental sustainability etc. On the 
contrary, true Keynesian ideology does not depend on growth, therefore, if followed, it gives 
governments ‘freedom’ to transform problems like unemployment, pollution, infrastructure, 
deforestation etc. into specific solutions and massive investments. (Harris, 2013) 
Persisting economical and ecological problems in the World have urged many 
environmentalists to compose a toolkit of political views and techniques under the name of 
Green Keynesianism – that is, Keynesian fiscal policies combined with environmental 
objectives. The hope is that a revised and ‘greened’ Keynesian thinking can offer a solution to 
both economic stagnation and a guidance away from a GHG-intensive direction. (Harris, 2013; 
Pollin, 2018) 
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The critics of Green Keynesianism dispute that it is not possible to achieve both economical 
growth and environmental sustainability. It’s a paradox – If one is achieved, it likely fails in the 
other. In their opinion, “Keynesianism is not the answer, because it (the ideology) is all about 
expanding demand”. (Blackwater, 2012) 
But green Keynesians assure us that there would not be any serious obstacles to economic 
growth. Instead, they see the issue in how economic growth is defined (Harris, 2010). Does it 
depend on mining, consumption import, etc. or should it focus more on energy-efficient service-
oriented activities? For example, there are certain parts of GDP formula (like investments in 
RES) that are ecologically favorable or neutral, thus economical prosperity could also be 
achieved with a shift from consumption-focused economy to one that is highly investment-
focused (Jackson-Senker, 2009). In other words, moving towards an economy that prioritizes 
investments in energy efficiency, environmental conservation and RES technology 
installations. Consequently, it can be claimed that the obstacles to achieve equilibrium between 
ecology and economy are institutional and political, not economic (Harris, 2013). 
Jonathan M. Harris proposes to replace or reform the GDP as a form of economic measurement, 
so that it would be easier to distinguish between those macroeconomic aggregates that should 
be strictly limited and those that can grow over time without negative environmental 
consequences (Harris, 2010). In other words, “angelising” the GDP, as Herman Daly (1973) 
framed it. Shortly, the goal of “angelisation” is to limit or remove the factor of resource- and 
energy-intensive sectors, which have negative effect on the environment, in the calculations for 
the value of the economy. It is believed that there are enough opportunities for economic growth 
in resource-conserving and service-oriented sectors, like healthcare, education, RES and others. 
Obviously, this kind of new direction will not happen through market mechanisms alone, thus 
it depends upon strong government leadership (Harris, 2010). 
From one angle, advanced simultaneous reforms are advised to move countries from 
consumption-based economies to one focused on sufficiency (Zehner, 2012), but from another, 
fiscal policy is seen as an essential tool achieving full employment, social equity and 
environmental sustainability which all are considered highly important fields in a sustainable 
economy (Harris, 2010). 
Fiscal policy is where the (green) Keynesian policy toolkit is viewed as most useful – both, its 
contractionary and expansionary methods are able to reduce ecological deficits by placing taxes 
on environmentally unfriendly and subsidising environmentally friendly sectors of the economy 
(Harris, 2013). In regards to RES and the energy sector, to effectively solve economical 
stagnation and environmental problems, two targets are recommended to government offices to 
be set:  
1. To reduce overall energy use (or TPES - Total Primary Energy Supply) by 1% of energy 
consumption per year, 
2. To raise the share of RES in energy consumption (or in TPES) by 1% per year. (Harris, 
2019) 
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In conclusion, a combination of Keynesian and environmental principles with strong 
government leadership is advised to make the transition to a more sustainable economy, which 
is able to take care of both the environment and the society. The bad news is that required 
investments in infrastructure, RES, energy efficiency, etc. to maintain our environment are 
colossal. But the good news is that these expenditures would offer economies many 
opportunities to expand (GCEC, 2018). And for measuring the expanse of that kind of an 
economy an “angelised” version of GDP is recommended. 
 
The task of this work is to prove that an increase of in renewable energy sources in a 
state’s energy portfolio brings economical success. The confirmation or refutation to the 
statement is potentially achieved via a series of quantitative correlation tests conducted between 
different economic indicators, like GDP, and a value representing renewable technologies’ 
share in TPES. If the correlation results return as positive, then they will confirm the hypothesis 
that by increasing energy efficiency, employment opportunities, investments, and by decreasing 
environmental costs etc. with the help of RES, implementation of its technology is beneficial 
to a modern states’ economies. The research also investigates if RES implementation impacts 
the World’s green, brown and black growth economies differently. 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Indicators 
The goal of this research is to see if renewable energy brings benefits to the economy. The 
success of the modern economy can be measured in multiple ways, starting with indicators that 
sum up gross revenues, savings or investments, all the way up to aggregates that consist of non-
financial measures, where value is measured with questionnaires about overall happiness in life. 
The following list of economic indicators are believed to be the best fit to measure what kind 
of effect renewable energy sources have had on modern economies. 
Indicator 1. RES/TPES 
RES/TPES is a share of renewable energy sources (RES) contribution to total primary 
energy supply (TPES). What RES/TPES specifically shows is what percentage of share 
renewable energy sources have in total energy supplied in the economy. The higher the value, 
the more likely that the economy is moving towards a green growth economy. Renewables 
included in the aggregate include “hydro (excluding pumped storage), geothermal, solar, wind, 
tide and wave sources. Energy derived from solid biofuels, biogasoline, biodiesels, other liquid 
biofuels, biogases and the renewable fraction of municipal waste are also included” (OECD, 
2019). 
RES/TPES is the independent variable used throughout this work to conduct correlation tests 
against dependent economic variables, because it resembles accurately half of the hypothesis 
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of this work. Its value is used by calculating the difference between two different periods or 
years. For example, if the value in 2005 was 5.4% and in 2010 it was 8.1%, then a total growth 
between these periods were calculated – 2.7%. It resembles the increase of share of renewable 
in TPES, not an increase of total RES capacity.  
Modern economies are recommended to increase RES share in TPES by 1% per year to avoid 
economic stagnation and environmental catastrophe (Harris, 2019). Finding out with the help 
of empirical analysis if this progress is actualizing, is a central part of this thesis. 
Indicator 2. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
 GDP is the most widely used indicator to measure (in USD) the size of an economy. 
According to OECD (2019) it “is the standard measure of the value added created through the 
production of goods and services in a country during a certain period. As such, it also measures 
the income earned from that production, or the total amount spent on final goods and services 
(less imports).” The indicator was picked for this research because it is globally the most 
recognized and most widely reported economic aggregate, thanks to this, the tests can be 
conducted on a very ample sample frame, representing states from different geographies and 
development stages.  
It includes under one variable all major sectors in the country that have a relationship with 
money. 
 GDP value was (1) always used in per capita basis to standardise the value between 
economies of different sizes; (2) similar to RES/TPES measured as growth throughout a period 
of five or six years; (3) not standardised (e.g. Real GDP, Nominal GDP etc.) between sample 
frames, just as long identical type of GDP indicator was used on one sample case. 
Going back to chapter 1.2, since RES has influence on many economic sectors, like 
investments, taxes, salaries, business expenses government spending, and GDP indicators 
include all of the stated in its equation, then in theory, growth in RES/TPES should be reflected 
in GDP figures. 
The criticism of GDP is that it does not distinguish between those macroeconomic aggregates 
that were produced with negative environmental consequences and those that weren’t (Harris, 
2010). Since RES could deliver for a country reaching further than just only finance, more 
economic indicators were included in this research. 
Indicator 3. Energy Intensity (EI) 
 Energy Intensity is an alternative option for measuring RES’ share effect on the 
economy on a GDP basis. While total primary energy supply (TPES) is already part of the RES 
share indicator as the denominator, then EI makes it also part of GDP’s indicator. Only in this 
case it’s the numerator: TPES divided by GDP of a country. According to the World Bank 
(2019) EI “is an indication of how much energy is used to produce one unit of economic 
output.” The smaller the value of the indicator, the more efficient and mature is the economy 
(Smil, 2017). 
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 EI fits well with the goal of this research to discover if RES implementation has been 
beneficial to economies, because both, its denominator and the numerator, are being impacted 
by the renewable energy industry. Since RES in theory (IRENA, 2017) via increased efficiency, 
lessens the value of the numerator (TPES) and certainly via increased economic activity 
increases the value of the denominator (GDP), then overall, the value of EI would be expected 
to decrease. 
EI was included in the correlation calculations in the form of its difference between two points 
of time, receiving the total improvement or progress. For example, if the United Kingdom’s 
EI’s score in 1999 was 4.98 and in 2015 3.01, then the total improvement for the country was 
1.97. This number would be inserted in correlation coefficients’ formulas to observe if there’s 
correlation with RES share increase. 
The downside of using EI in this research was that the values available had been reported by 
states only till 2015. Considering that RES industry improves almost exponentially, EI does not 
help researching the most recent years where, potentially, energy efficiency improvement 
around the globe have been the biggest. 
Indicator 4. ANS –Adjusted net savings, including particulate emission damage. 
 The utilisation of adjusted net savings (ANS), including particulate emission damage, 
in this research represents the idea of ‘angelising’ the GDP (Daly, 1973). It is far from being 
similar to GDP, but it resembles the ideas (Harris, 2010) covered in the theoretical part because 
it, in some extent, distinguishes environmentally beneficial economic activities from the 
harmful ones. Compared to more suitable indicators, like GPI (Genuine Progress Indicator), 
ANS is globally reported, which simplified the process of this research. According to The 
World Bank (2019) ANS is net national savings, “plus education expenditure and minus energy 
depletion, mineral depletion, net forest depletion, and carbon dioxide and particulate emissions 
damage.” While GDP measures all the revenue produced in a state, ANS sums up how much 
the state has saved on its bank account, arguably being more adequate at valuating how wealthy 
a country is. 
The value of ANS was, before calculations, standardised to a per capita value to better represent 
the welfare of the population and eliminate differences between total size of economies. The 
value that was correlated against RES/TPES, was the total amount of savings per capita the 
state accumulated throughout the period. In RES context, ANS does not count the investments 
and profits made by the industry, but it includes, for example, the amount of profit’s saved, 
reservation of natural resources and pollution damage caused by the energy sector. 
Indicator 5. Total GHGs emissions 
  The first indicator that will be used in the empirical part of this paper is the total 
greenhouse gas’ (GHG) emissions. By United Nations’ (2019) database GHG excludes 
emissions related to land use and forestry, but includes carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
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nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) etc. The indicator is measured in kilotonne 
CO2 equivalent. 
The indicator was included in the analysis when Peter Victor’s theory (2010) of green, brown 
and black growth economies was tested with GHG Intensity (GHG/GDP). Truth to be told, 
since his work had not specified which GDP indicator precisely to use, and because different 
versions of GDPs delivered country-basis different overall results, then this research decided to 
not follow his theory word-for-word and replaced GHG intensity with only GHG. Nevertheless, 
it was discovered that the variance in results differences was not very different than it was 
between different GDP indicators. 
Total GHG emissions indicator is important for this research because it helps to understand 
better the researched sample frames, but since the theory needs more research, the results of 
green growth economies in this paper are advised to be approached as illustrative, not factual. 
 
2.2 Method 
This research was carried out using a quantitative method on the basis of two different 
correlation coefficients: Pearson’s r and Spearman’s rho (ρ). The first one, Pearson’s r was 
selected not because it is one of the most widely used correlation evaluaters, but because it 
shows the strength and direction of the correlation. Therefore, if the researched variable, 
RES/TPES, increases, then, hypothetically, an economic indicator’s value should also increase, 
giving the Pearson’s r value above 0. The same, but in a negative direction, applies in the case 
of RES decrease in a country’s energy porftolio.     
Initially, it was planned to use only Pearson’s r coefficient to conduct the tests, but since 
empirical observations discovered that Pearson’s equation was, in many occasions, leaving out 
of the selection very influential outliers, then a Spearman’s ρ was introduced to the research in 
order to offer an alternative result for each conducted test. Spearman’s ρ input was valuable 
because of its simplicity. Compared to Pearson’s r, it does not require us to distinguish outliers 
from the selection, therefore it offered actual results on the sample frame. On the other hand, 
since some of the sample frames, especially the ones that included the developing world, where 
disparate – standard deviation (ST DEV) values ranging between 6-9 – a Pearson’s r coefficient 
was trusted over Spearman’s ρ. 
The data to conduct the tests was gathered from public databases released by international 
organisations like the World Bank (2019), the OECD (2019) and the EU (Eurostat, 2019), who 
have collected the data in cooperation with their member states. In order to categorize the data, 
to standardise indicators’ value and to calculate correlation, Microsoft Excel 2013 software with 
its functions, like ’PEARSON’ for Pearson’s r and ’CORREL’ for Spearman’s ρ, were used. In 
addition, MS Excel assisted also with identifying and removing outliers for Pearson’s r equation 
with ’QUARTILE, 1’ and ’QUARTILE, 3’ functions. The use of these functions also helped to 
succesfully discover data that might be false.  
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The data analysis was focused on a concept of dividing the total researched timeline (2000-
2017) into 3 different periods of time (e.g. 2000-2005, 2006-2010, 2011-2017), and the values 
for the indicators, that were going to be inserted in correlations’ formulas, were derived by 
calculating the total difference between the two ends of the time period or by summing up all 
the values reported throughout the period. The reason to use predominantly five-year periods 
for observations was because the RES industry has still remained premature in many countries. 
Thus, annual statistical view would have produced inadequate information. 
The selection of sample sizes was based on an understanding that present environmental 
problems are a global issue – thus, sample sizes had to involve countries from different 
geographical positions and economical development levels. Moving forward, the selection of 
countries were roughly divided into two groups: the developed and the developing World, 
which where further divided, making up in total, four sample frames: 
1. OECD. This sample frame consists of all the 36 member states of the OECD (2020). 
The OECD was selected to be one of the sample frames because of it’s very high 
availability of data and similar development stages of member states’ economies, 
despite their geographical position. 
2. EU. The EU’s sample frame’s selection consisted of all the current 28-member states’ 
data, with ~95% information available. The EU’s sample frame covers in large part the 
same selection of countries as the OECD does, giving the two an opportunity to confirm 
or decline the correlation present in the test results based on different databases (e.g. 
Eurostat (2019) versus OECD (2020)). 
3. BRIICSZ. The name ‘BRIICSZ’ is the author’s creation to ‘squeeze’ together in one 
sample frame all of the world’s major economies (based on G20 membership) that are 
not members of the OECD. These countries are Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Argentina. The last one of the list did not receive ‘a 
spot’ in the abbreviation because then the name would have lost its meaningful 
resemblance to the informal international economic development group of BRICS, 
where more than half of the countries from this sample frame are members of (BRICS, 
2020). BRIICSZ by any means is not a group of countries with meaningful central 
policy or cooperation, but it represents the developing part of the World that because of 
the sizes of their respective economies, might have had more financial capacity to 
implement renewable energy technologies. 
4. LDCs. Represent the least developed countries. These 51 countries were selected based 
on the World Bank’s 2015 year GDP per capita (Appendix 1) statistics, drawing the line 
at $5000 USD per year. All the countries below this number, were selected, incl. 
Indonesia and India that are also part of BRIICSZ. The abundance of countries in the 
sample frame gave the necessary flexibility to manage statistical problems like gaps in 
data, which for this group of countries was a recurring issue. 
A separate section in this research has been devoted to Victor’s (2010) theory of green, brown 
and black growth economies, a classification made based on a states’ GHG emission and GDP 
growth rates. His theory does not directly correspond to the main thesis, but a test trial 
conducted covering a part of the centre core of Victor’s vision, which are tightly connected to 
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the renewable energy industry’s ideology, gave a valuable overview of the created sample 
frames’ climate change mitigation track record. Thus, the main goal of paragraph 3.1 is to offer 
adequate perspective and support for the research of the main thesis in the following chapters. 
 
3. Results and Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Green, Brown or Black Growth 
The first goal of this empirical analyse is to become familiar with the sample case by 
figuring out with the aid of A. Victor’s ecological economics theory (Victor, 2010) how many 
countries in each sample case could be classified as black, brown, green growth or even green 
degrowth economies. The results are expected to (1) show if modern states are moving towards 
the green economy; and (2) offer a bigger overview on current global progress in climate 
mitigation, as well a better perspective when analysing each sample frame on RES 
implementation’s role on the direction of economies. 
Starting with OECD, the trial results on figure 3.1 show that based on average GDP and 
GHG growth, majority (80%) of the members between 2000-2017 have been brown growth 
economies - there’s been an average annual decrease of GHG emissions by 0.6% while the 
GDP grew by 7.5%/year. The rest of the sample frame during the same period qualified as black 
growth economies. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 - GDP & GHG emissions growth directions in OECD member countries. 
OECD % of countries 2000-2017 2000-2005 2006-2010 2011-2017 
Black Growth 20% 53% 25% 18% 
Brown Growth 80% 47% 53% 59% 
Green Growth 0% 0% 14% 12% 
In Transition   0% 8% 12% 
GDP AVE annual growth 7.5% 7.5% 4.6% 5.4% 
GHG AVE annual growth -0.6% 0.5% -1.0% -1.9% 
Difference 6.9% 8.0% 3.6% 3.5% 
  Author’s created                                  Source: OECD 
Breaking the timeline down to five-to-six-year periods, figure 3.1 examplifies a trend moving 
towards brown and green growth economies. In 2011-2017 there were only 18% of the 
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countries left under the black growth economy classification compared to 53% during the years 
between 2000-2005. The rest were 62% in brown growth, 12% in green growth (GHG 
emissions decrease faster than GDP grows) and 9% labelled as “in transition”. The category “in 
transition” was created throughout the course of this research to reveal the amount of countries 
in process of becoming a green growth economy – that is, countries with a decreasing GHG 
emissions rate which is not more than 0.66% slower than annual GDP growth. Based on this 
research OECD’s green growth members during the most recent period (2011-2017) were 
Finland, Greece, Norway and United Kingdom. Countries which are still reporting increase in 
GHG emissions (black growth) are Lithuania, Turkey, Portugal, Poland, South Korea and 
Hungary. Overall OECD members make together up a brown growth economy. 
 Figure 3.2 reveals that in the EU there’s also been a trend away from black growth 
economies: 61% of the members in 2000-2005 versus 4% remaining in 2011-2016. Being 
partially related to OECD’s sample frame, the EU is today dominated by brown growth 
economies (82%) and the union as the whole can be categorized as “in transition”: average 
annual GHG decrease in 2011-2016 was only 0.6% slower than annual GDP increase. 
Figure 3.2 - GDP & GHG emissions growth directions in EU member countries. 
% of EU members 2000-2016 2000-2005 2006-2010 2011-2016 
Black Growth 14% 61% 18% 4% 
Brown Growth 86% 39% 75% 82% 
Green Growth 0% 0% 4% 7% 
In Transition N/A 0% 4% 7% 
GDP AVE annual growth 8.4% 7.6% 5.7% 4.8% 
GHG AVE annual growth -0.7% 0.9% -1.2% -1.8% 
GDP-GHG*-1 7.7% 8.5% 4.4% 2.9% 
     Author’s created                                    Source: UNDP & OECD 
EU’s green growth economies are Greece and Finland, with Ireland being the sole black growth 
economy. 
Based on the data available for the period of 2000-2012, BRIICSZ have as individual 
entities and as a whole remained in the black growth category. Despite that, the groups’ average 
GHG emissions growth has slowed down: 11% of total growth throughout 2006-2010 
compared to 30% between the years of 2000-2005, while GDP growth in the same periods fell 
from 44% down to just 39%. ‘The blackest’ of all the economies in this group belongs to Saudi 
Arabia, whose GHG emissions in total increased by 25% more than its GDP. The country which 
is closest to a transition to a brown growth economy is Argentina (2% GHG growth versus 32% 
GDP growth in 2006-2010). (World Bank, 2019; OECD, 2019) 
Figure 3.3 implies that there is a similar movement towards green growth economy 
amongst the World’s LDCs, but there’s been a noticeable turnaround in 2011-2012, when every 
one of the countries in the sample frame were categorized as black growth economies, instead 
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of 64% in 2006-2010. What is more, comparing 2000-05 & 2011-12, the GDP’s average annual 
growth had decreased by 0.5% and GHG emissions growth had slowed down by 0.5%. 
Figure 3.3 - GDP & GHG emissions growth directions in LDCs 
% of LDCs  2000-2012 2000-2005 2006-2010 2011-2012 
Black Growth 78% 78% 64% 100% 
Brown Growth 22% 20% 22% 0% 
Green Growth 0% 0% 14% 0% 
In Transition 0% 2% 0% 0% 
GDP AVE annual Growth 7.3% 5.8% 5.8% 5.3% 
GHG AVE annual Growth 2.2% 3.2% 0.7% 2.7% 
Difference 9.5% 9.0% 6.5% 8.0% 
Author’s created                                   Source: World Bank 
Conclusion 
As a result of this trial, there is a stark contrast in comparison between the developed 
(OECD & EU) and the developing (BRIICZ & LDCs) countries’ sample frames. While the 
LDCs make up 100% (note: a more recent data might reveal a smaller share) a black growth 
economy, the developed countries are today mainly brown economies with fairly small, but 
equal share divided between green and black growth economies. This balance of unbalances is 
illustrated well by the opposing positions at the ongoing UN’s COP (Conference of the Parties) 
climate talks: decreasing GHG emissions is much more expensive for the developing countries 
than it is for the developed states, therefore bigger financial, technical and institutional support 
from the latter has been required and requested (UNFCCC, 2008). While large parts of the 
developed World are close to becoming green growth economies, there is still a long way to go 
for the rest of the World.  
The biggest leap towards the green growth economy was made during the period of 2006-
2010 when the the difference between GHG emissions decrease and GDP growth rate shrank 
by 2-4% in different sample frames. Without trying to take the credit away from environmental 
lobbyists, the two dependant indicators were surely affected by the 2007-2008 financial crises, 
when GDP decreased worldwide, resulting in smaller economies that emitted less GHG. This 
might also explain the sudden turnaround to black growth economy in 2011-2012 by the LDCs 
– their regained confidence in the global economy could have ignited local economies, 
therefore, also sped up the emittance of GHGs. 
In conclusion, the developed part of the modern World is moving towards a system of green 
growth economy, but the World as a whole is not. The count of black growth economies, 
although succeeding at slowing down the rate of increase of their GHG emissions, outweighs 
the number of current green economies, thus making the total global economy a black growth 
one. What is even more important, these outnumbering black growth economies outweigh its 
counterparts also in GDP and population growth rates, making the mutual aspiration of reducing 
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GHG total emissions even harder. The supporting analysis of the thesis in the following 
chapters will examine what kind of role renewable energy plays in the direction of these 
economies. 
 
3.2 Renewable Energy’s Effect on the Economy – GDP 
To discover if renewable energy implementation has had any effect on states’ economies, 
this research carried out numerous tests on multiple time periods to find a correlation between 
RES/TPES share increase and GDP growth. The goal is to confirm if the stated thesis that ‘RES 
politics improve economies and societies welfare’ is true or not. This is observed separately on 
developed and developing countries’ sample frames. 
We start with the group of developed states, OECD and EU members that during the 
period of 2000-2017 were predominantly brown growth economies (Figure 3.1 & 3.2). Despite 
the improvements made with GHG emittance reduction, this research revealed (Figure 3.4) 
adversarial results for the complete observed time period (2000-2017): half of the data 
correlation trials returned a weak positive correlation while the other half showed a weak 
positive correlation between RES/TPES and GDP growths. What’s worth to highlight is the 
reason behind the polarising difference between EU and EU RES-E (share of renewable 
electricity) – the difference is most likely created because of a missing dataset about EU’s RES-
E for the period of 2000-2005.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 - Developed countries RES/TPES & GDP Growth Correalation 
Pearson's R (r) 
Period TOTAL 
I 
2000-05 
II 
2006-10 
III 
2011-17 
RES 
STDEV 
Source Comment 
Spearman's (ρ) 
OECD  
2000-
2017 
-0.134 0.356 -0.058 -0.324 - 
OECD   
0.196 0.184 -0.069 -0.061 5.878 
EU 
2000-
2017 
0.177 0.199 -0.020 0.066 - OECD ja 
WB 
  
0.111 0.047 -0.035 0.043 4.476 
EU (RES-E) 
2005-
2018 
-0.170 - -0.250 0.180 - 
Eurostat 
RES-E 
only -0.206 - -0.369 -0.014 8.396 
 Author’s created    
 Pearson’s r value for OECD in period I, 2000-2005, shows a moderate positive 
correlation (0.356) between the two variables (figure 3.4). Although, when the test was run 
through once more with Spearman’s ρ, the correlation changed to a weak positive, proving the 
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existence of influential outliers (revealed in blue on figure 3.5) in OECD’s sample frame. The 
tests for EU returned one weak correlation with Pearson’s r, but when outliers were included 
with Spearman’s ρ, then countries with very high GDP growth, but no RES improvements to 
report (e.g. Estonia, Latvia), changed the result to disassociation. 
Figure 3.5 - OECD 2000-2005 RES/TPES & GDP Correlation 
 
Author’s created             Source: OECD 
Tests conducted on period II, 2006-2010, revealed for the EU two results of weak 
negative and two instances without correlation. Disassociation applied also to both of the tests 
carried out on OECD (figure 3.4). Throughout this period the most significant value that can be 
brought out are of EU’s RES Electricity (RES-E), where both coefficients revealed that 
increasing the share of renewable electricity in the total electricity portfolio decreased chances 
of economic growth. Figure 6 reveals that many states, especially the outliers, with the highest 
GDP growth had a limited amount of RES-E increase, while the states that by the reported 
TPES share data were the biggest RES-E investors, experienced in many cases an economic 
halt throughout the period.  
Figure 3.6 - EU 2005-2010 RES-E & GDP correlation. 
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Author’s created        Source: Eurostat 
The overall picture of tests conducted on period III (2011-17,-18) showed no correlation 
between the two variables, with one instance of weak positive (EU RES-E, r=+0.180) and one 
instance of moderate negative (OECD, r=-0.324) correlation. Both of the results were retested 
with Spearman’s ρ, which showed disassociation. (Figure 3.4) 
Developing countries 
 The biggest takeaway from Victor’s (2010) green growth tests conducted on developing 
countries was, that all together they make up a black growth economy – meaning that both 
growths are present, growth in GHG emittance and in GDP. As the correlation tests’ results on 
figure 3.7 show, BRIICSZ and LDCs differ on how RES has affected their economies. 
Throughout 2000-2017 BRIICSZ’s statistics prove that an average RES decrease of -3.9% in 
TPES did not harm their economies: 186% GDP growth in average (OECD, 2019). While 
Pearson’s r gives a moderate negative correlation (-0.392), then Spearman’s ρ includes China, 
the outlier, and shows that there’s a strong (-0.714) negative correlation between RES and 
GDP increases.  
 
Figure 3.7 - Developing countries RES/TPES & GDP Growth Correalation 
Pearson's R (r) 
Period TOTAL I 
2000-05 
II 
2006-10 
III 
2011- 
RES 
STDEV 
Source Comment 
Spearman's (ρ) 
BRIICSZ 
2000-
2017 
-0.392 -0.420 -0.418 0.303 - OECD, 
WB 
  
-0.714 -0.619 -0.405 -0.024 5.461 
LDCs 
2000-
2015 
0.049 0.133 -0.070 0.044 - 
WB 
RES (excl. 
Hydro) -0.220 0.104 -0.128 -0.018 8.132 
Author’s created 
-6.00
-4.00
-2.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
-10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
R
ES
 -
E 
Sh
ar
e
GDP Growth
Spearman's ρ Pearson's r
26 
 
In comparison, LDCs overall experienced a very weak negative correlation in 2000-2017. The 
difference here is probably the global status and opportunities countries have in different 
groups. Despite strong correlation, the affecting variable in BRIICSZ case might not even be 
RES, but the amount of revenue few of the states in the group receive from oil exports and the 
‘upper hand’ bigger states normally have in international trade negotiations. 
Period I (2000-2005) results are for BRIICSZ an exemplary of the total measured 
timeline, but for LDCs the correlation results this time show a very weak positive correlation. 
These outcomes should not be taken very seriously since about half of the countries in the 
sample frame didn’t add any non-hydro RES electricity in their energy portfolio. 
Period II was a continuation to period I, although there were many more countries 
amongst the LDCs who had started to invest in non-hydro RES technologies. Figure 8 shows 
that while BRIICSZ black growth market scenario was business as usual – with Brazil solely 
increasing RES share, then LDCs positioning on the graph is very much scattered: there’s been 
trials with the new technology in economies that have vastly different GDP growth outcomes. 
In 2006-2010 period, Pearson’s and Spearman’s coefficients returned very similar outcomes on 
both sample frames. 
Figure 3.8 - Developing countries’ Pearson’s r correlation of RES & GDP in 2006-2010 
 
Author’s created                                                                   Source: OECD & World Bank 
Period III (2011-2017) was for the BRIICSZ group of countries much different than the 
previous ones. For the first time the tests were not only without negative correlation, but this 
period Pearson’s r returned also a moderate positive correlation of 0.300. The outlier on this 
instance was India, who, when included to the formula, with its 62.1% GDP growth and -4.82% 
RES share (OECD, 2019) decrease, gives Spearman’s ρ value of -0.024. On the other hand, 
because during this period there’s no correlation between the two variables in both sample 
frames, the BRIICSZ and the LDCs, an improvement can be stated: RES implementation no 
longer backpedals their economies. 
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Conclusion 
 To bring together all the correlation tests ran on the four sample frames, the results show 
that RES implementation does have some kind of an effect on GDP growth, but the effect is 
different for developed and developing countries. If the tests on developing countries overall 
did return a negative correlation, then for the developed countries the observed periods were all 
different, with negative, positive and disassociation all represented. 
2000-2005 showed a low positive correlation for OECD members, but a moderate 
negative one for BRIICSZ. OECD results could be overestimated, since 2000-2005 represented 
decent economic growth for developed countries and it was the time when early adopters, that 
is wealthy nations, could afford expensive RES technologies’ implementation. The risks to 
change their energy policy were manageable. On the other hand, for BRIICSZ, the World’s 
largest developing economies, investing in RES deployment was not the decision that was 
made, due to the fact that their growing energy demands and socio-economic needs urged them 
to invest in quicker solutions, like coal-fired power plants, oil exports etc. 
The II period, 2006-2010, was characterised by the 2007-08 global financial crises. While it 
was the period where most of the developing countries started investing in RES, for the EU 
investments in RES-E (figure 3.4) proved to have a negative effect on its economy. 
The III researched period, when outliers, like India, were included in the results, delivered 
similar results between the developed and developing countries sample frames - they both 
showed no correlation between RES and GDP growths. In comparison to previous periods, this 
result was not expected from developed states sample cases. Would the post financial-crisis 
period not have been a smart time to invest in RES technology that has gotten only cheaper 
over time?  Perhaps developed states capacities to install more RES achieved a certain level of 
maturity, having waited for technological improvements in RES (e.g. battery technology) to 
catch up. Or there might not be correlation because Europe’s economy continued to struggle 
during 2011-2017. 
For developing countries no correlation throughout the III period might not be what the number 
really shows, but a turning point (1) away from the tendency of RES’s negative effect on GDP 
growth and (2) towards a brown growth economy as the previous chapter’s results implied.  
 To conclude this part, RES share increase in TPES historically tends to have a negative 
influence on GDP growth, but the scale of effect is not strong enough to come to any final 
conclusions. What is more, GDP as an indicator has a couple weaknesses to be considered. 
Firstly, as it came out during the correlation tests, GDP is very strongly affected by global 
economic crisis, but a financial crisis does not equally affect the welfare of the society, as it 
affects the financial sector. Secondly, GDP’s formula includes sectors of the economy, like oil 
export etc., which arguably do not benefit the welfare of everyone in the society. A good 
example on this are the BRIICSZ countries that include big oil exporters like Russia and Saudi 
Arabia, whose GDP growth (304,8% & 63%; OECD, 2019) was throughout 2000-2017 relying 
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on oil export, while making minimum investments in RES share (respectively -0.53% & +0.01 
change in TPES; OECD, 2019). Examples of this kind suffice to change the results of the 
correlation, therefore raising the need to use other indicators to discover what manner of effect 
RES share increase does have on modern economies. 
 
3.3 Renewable Energy’s Effect on the Economy – Energy Intensity (EI) 
 The idea behind measuring Energy Intensity’s (EI) improvement’s correlation in 
comparison to RES share increase is an indirect way to see RES’s effect on GDP. Since (1) EI 
is an indicator, showing how much energy is used to produce one unit of economic output (eg. 
GDP); (2) energy efficiency is a major part of EI’s formula; and (3) RES is one of the most 
influential energy efficiency increasing variables in the 21st century, it gives enough reasons to 
observe if tests can confirm the theory that there is an association between the two. Thus, RES 
share increase could benefit the economy via increase in energy efficiency which results in 
lower energy intensity and higher growth in GDP. 
Test results conducted for the total period (2000-2015) represent a stark contrast between 
developed and developing countries. While the developed World showed no significant 
correlation (except EU RES-E, which was measured only between 2005-2015), then the 
developing countries, especially BRIICSZ, revealed a negative correlation between RES share 
and EI developments. (Figure 3.9)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 - RES & EI Correlation Results. 
Pearson's R ( r ) 
Period TOTAL 
I  
2000-05 
II 
2006-10 
III 
2011-15 
RES 
STDEV 
Source Comment 
Spearman's (ρ) 
OECD  
2000-
2015 
0.110 0.347 0.062 0.015  - 
OECD   
0.047 0.346 0.160 0.128 5.1 
EU 
2000-
2015 
0.097 0.322 0.126 0.073  - 
OECD   
0.025 0.354 0.182 0.161 4.1 
EU (RES-E) -0.200  - -0.337 -0.115  - Eurostat 
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Author’s created. 
In closer observation, the biggest contrast between the two opposite sides was in the period of 
2000-2005: developed countries were showing a weak positive correlation, opposed to 
developing countries’ moderate or weak negative correlations. Figure 3.10 of the LDCs’ in 
2000-2005 shows well, how the few LDCs that invested in RES experienced no improvement 
in EI. Even the biggest outliers, Kenya (RES +7.65%) and Nicaragua (RES +4.27%), 
experienced no improvement in energy intensity (World Bank, 2019). Figure 3.10 also shows 
that the LDCs that decided to hold off from RES implementing policies during the time span, 
and perhaps invested their funds in other energy efficiency solutions, did show developments 
of EI in half of the cases.  
Figure 3.10 - LDCs Pearson’s r Correlation of RES & EI in 2000-2005 
 
Author’s created      Data source: World Bank 
         
In period II (2006-10) the vast distance between the developed and the developing 
countries somewhat lessened. If RES did continue to have a slightly positive effect on the 
former’s EI, then it had a weak/moderate negative correlation in the latter’s sample frame.  
What does look like an anomaly, is the difference between EU’s ‘RES-E’ and ‘EU’ results. To 
remind, RES-E represents the share of renewables in total produced electricity and the latter is 
total share of renewable energy in total primary energy supply. Figure 3.11 reveals, RES-E 
increase in electricity’s sector worked counter effectively towards EI. The difference is too big 
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compared to RES TPES to blame it for a slightly different timeline (EU RES-E’s results are 
from 2005-10 vs. EU is 2006-10). On the other hand, the difference could be caused by (1) 
different databases: Eurostat versus OECD, (2) technological improvements in respective 
sectors or (3) it is a comparison of natural (EU) versus aggressive (EU RES-E) policies. 
Figure 3.11 - EU versus EU RES-E Pearson’s r Correlation of RES & EI in 2006-2010 
 
Author’s created       Source: OECD, Eurostat. 
RES’s effect on EI, positive or negative, had waned on all of the sample frames by 2011-
2017 (figure 3.9). The only remaining one with significant strength in correlation was BRIICSZ. 
In comparison to previous periods, where the correlation for the group between RES and EI 
was mostly moderate negative, then in this period the Spearman’s ρ coefficient shows a weak 
positive correlation of 0.310 (figure 3.12). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 - BRIICSZ’ 2011-2015 RES & EI Pearson’s r versus Spearman’s ρ 
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Author’s created     Source: OECD & the World Bank 
Spearman’s ρ value on figure 3.12 reveals the outliers (in orange) that Pearson’s r leaves out of 
the equation. Firstly, China, positioning far right on the graph, statistically has made a big leap 
while increasing its RES’ share in TPES. This is an improvement compared to 2000-2005 when 
the country’s RES share decreased by 8.5% in TPES (OECD, 2019) and EI was quiescent – 
0.48 point improvement (WB, 2019). Secondly, Brazil and India at the bottom of the graph, 
represent a direction away from RES solutions: the former with 3.34% and the latter with 4.71% 
RES share decrease in TPES (OECD, 2019). The graph suggests that these developments also 
have affected their EI results, especially for Brazil whose EI score decreased by 0.24 points 
throughout 2011-15. 
It could be argued that BRIICSZ is a very small sample frame from which to draw any big 
conclusions, but the results show some kind of a direction to the World’s biggest developing 
economies to consider - investing in energy efficient RES solutions. BRIICSZ results also 
confirm LDCs correlation results in 2011-15 (r=0.101; ρ= -0.046 (figure 3.9)), which suggest 
that RES implementation has stopped to have a countereffect on developing countries EI. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the RES versus EI correlation tests conducted on the sample frames 
showed a connection between the variables. For EU & OECD, increase of RES share in TPES 
has proved to have a positive effect on EI, but EU RES-E results revealed that an aggressive 
movement (e.g. subsidies) towards a RES dominant electricity portfolio, might leave out other 
important solutions achieving the green growth economy, thus harming EI. The small difference 
between the results of Spearman’s ρ and Pearson’s r also revealed a small number of outliers. 
Member states of the EU and OECD delivered fairly homogenous results, therefore, from this 
Brazil
China
India
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
-0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
R
ES
 S
h
ar
e 
C
h
an
ge
 (
in
 %
TP
ES
)
EI Improvement
Spearman's ρ
Pearson's r
32 
 
one could claim that a strong and effective presence of central policies in the respective fields 
in these international organisations are not only existent, but also effective. 
The outcome of correlation tests conducted on the developing World show that historically RES 
implementation has proved to have a negative effect on improving their energy intensity, but 
recent times (2011-15) show that this statement is no longer true. The factor here might be 
expenses related to RES technology. The possible turnaround in the results could be caused by 
(1) a developing country, like China, who throughout the researched period has grown to 
become increasingly analogous to a developed state; (2) or because of the rapidly decreasing 
costs of RES technology (IRENA, 2019b). Overall progress with the strength of correlation 
between EI and RES shows that while amongst the developed states RES is losing its positive 
effect on EI, the developing countries are lagging 15 years behind, having the RES momentum 
possibly just building up.   
 
3.4 Renewable Energy’s Effect on the Economy - Adjusted Net Savings 
(ANS), including particulate emission damage. 
Adjusted net savings (ANS), including particulate emission damage, is an aggregate 
that, considering its ingredients, should aid this research to find a more accurate correlation 
between RES on one hand and economic or welfare success on the other. Compared to GDP, 
ANS differs by summing up savings instead of revenue, but because it also treats the 
environment as an asset and excludes from its formula all financially profitable activities that 
are environmentally unsustainable (e.g. mining of mineral resources), then it might be a better 
indicator to discover if RES share increases in TPES benefits states’ economies. 
In summary, out of the 32 correlation tests conducted for the period 2000-2017, 19 of them 
returned a positive correlation value between ANS and RES’ increases, with three moderate 
and 16 weak positive correlations. Important to note is, that there was only one negative result 
in total – LDCs in 2000-2005. Overall 2000-2017 showed a positive weak correlation between 
RES share and ANS increased on three out of four sample frames (figure 3.13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13 - RES/TPES & ANS/cap Correlation Results. 
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Pearson's R (r) 
Period TOTAL 
I 
2000-05 
II 
2006-10 
III 
2011-17 
RES 
STDEV 
Source Comment 
Spearman's (ρ) 
OECD  
2000-
2017 
0.189 0.071 0.295 0.165   OECD, 
WB 
  
-0.005 0.037 0.088 0.245 5.5 
EU 
2000-
2017 
0.321 0.001 0.231 0.416   OECD, 
WB 
  
0.254 0.176 -0.039 0.402 4.8 
BRIICSZ 
2000-
2017 
0.154 -0.022 0.237 0.124   OECD, 
WB 
Wo. Saudi 
Arabia 0.143 0.179 0.143 0.357 5.7 
LDCs 
2000-
2015 
0.256 0.407 -0.074 0.004   
WB 
RES (excl. 
Hydro) 0.039 -0.192 0.023 0.035 8.5 
 Author’s created 
The first period (2000-2005) overall showed no correlation for the developed countries. On the 
other hand, for LDCs, Spearman’s and Pearson’s tests returned with contrasting outcomes: ρ= 
-0.192 & r= 0.407 (figure 3.13). On closer inspection it was discovered that neither of the 
coefficients’ equations are a fit on this particular sample frame at this particular timeline, 
because, if half of the countries have reported no change in their non-existent non-hydro RES 
sector (figure 3.14), then (a) the Pearson’s equation will leave almost any renewables’ increase 
or decrease out of the results, and (b) the Spearman’s rho gives all the values with zero an 
equal rank, plus, as experienced in this precise case, consequently ranks countries with non-
existent non-hydro RES industry higher than economies that had a decreased share of 
renewables in TPES. Giving bigger values for no activity at present and in the past in 
comparison to economies with existing non-hydro renewables, would provide misleading 
results. In addition, the standard deviation for this sample frame is high – 8.5. For these 
reasons, the research chose to ignore this particular test’s conflicting outcome. 
Figure 3.14 - LDCs 2000-2005 Unsuccesful RES & ANS Correlation Test 
 
Author’s created     Data source: World Bank 
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Period II, 2006-2010, shows for LDCs no correlation and for BRIICSZs, OECD and EU all 
weak positive correlation between RES and ANS/cap increases. BRIICSZ (excl. Saudi Arabia) 
group of countries was the only sample case that scored positively with both correlation 
coefficients (figure 3.13). 
The 2007-08 financial crisis did not seem to have a negative effect to RES’s association with 
ANS. On the contrary, a slight increase of strength of positive value between the two indicators 
suggests that the countries that increased their RES share throughout the period accumulated 
more net savings than the countries that didn’t. 
2011-2017 reveal positive correlation on all the researched instances besides the couple of tests 
ran on LDCs, which, indifferent to previous periods, showed no association between the two 
variables (figure 3.13). Figure 3.15 resembles how countries on both sides, developed and 
developing (BRIICSZ), are having an association between the two factors at some level, with 
the EU showing the strongest consistency of the two sample frames. 
Figure 3.15 - EU & BRIICSZ (incl. Saudi Arabia) 2011-2017 RES & ANS Correlation 
 
    Author’s created     Data Source: OECD & World Bank 
Conclusion 
While the developed countries (OECD & EU) and the major economies in the BRIICSZ 
group are trending towards positive in the correlation values between the years of 2000-2017, 
LDCs showed mostly no correlation throughout the period. Since ANS appears to remain 
unaffected in cases of small increases of RES share, it confirms what ANS really is – a measure 
of saving. The development level of LDC’s economies has been premature, enough as to not 
expect any reasonable return from renewables related economic activities, especially to expect 
savings. 
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It is worth highlighting from this chapter that BRIICSZ can have a positive RES/ANS 
correlation even when Saudi Arabia is included in the results – figure 3.15 highlights the state 
with twice higher ANS than any other country from its group, while at the same time reporting 
no change in RES implementation. Since BRIICSZ sample frame’s selection is relatively small, 
Saudi Arabia does influence the results of the group significantly. To bring an example, 
Spearman’s ρ value 0.357 in the period of 2011-2017, if Saudi Arabia where to have been 
included, would be almost twice as weak - ρ = 0.190. The reason why Saudi Arabia was decided 
to be left out of the Spearman’s correlation tests (Pearson’s r removed Saudi Arabia from the 
sample frame as a GDP outlier) conducted between RES and ANS, is because, it would have 
hidden the actual influence renewables implementation has had on economic progress in ANS 
context in BRIICSZ. To conclude, The ANS/RES correlation results suggest that BRIICSZ 
states are in most cases progressing from a black to brown growth economy. In other words, 
the part of the ANS equation that sums up savings from mostly sustainable activities in the 
economy, accumulates more funds than is the cost of environmentally harmful simultaneous 
activities. 
For the EU and OECD, the developed world, RES and ANS correlation results showed a 
consistent positive value increase throughout the total researched period. The result shows that 
as time passes, the developed world gains more savings (economic benefit) with any increase 
in the share of renewables it makes in TPES. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The goal of this empirical analysis was to discover if renewable energy could have some 
kind of an effect on modern states’ economies. In order to achieve that, the supporting economic 
indicators of the analysis, like GDP, ANS and EI, were inserted in Spearman’s ρ and Pearson’s 
r correlation equations to see how they relate to the increase or decrease of the share of 
renewable energy sources in the TPES. The 96 correlation tests carried out proved that there is 
an association between RES/TPES and the enlisted economic variables. The following are the 
main findings of the conducted tests. 
I - The developed (OECD, EU) and the developing countries (BRIICSZ, LDCs) are affected by 
renewable energy differently.  
The conducted trials inspired by Victor’s (2010) green growth economy theory proved 
that a correct categorisation of states was made when constructing the sample frames – even 
though the groups were deliberately divided to the developing and the developed World, the 
trials, based on GHG and GDP growths, also confirmed that there’s acute difference between 
the two groups. While the developed countries received a classification of brown growth 
economies (figure 3.1 & 3.2), meaning that on average their GHGs’ emissions decrease while 
GDP increases, then the developing World could be labelled as mostly black growth economy 
(figure 3.3), where GHGs emissions and GDP are simultaneously increasing.   
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Further correlation analysis on the three different economic indicators also confirmed the 
differences between the two sample frames. First of all, increase in RES’ share in TPES showed 
a very weak positive effect on the economies of the developed countries, but on the contrary 
proved to have a moderately negative effect on the developing states. The same, but with even 
more contrastingly, was true with EI – the developed countries succeeded with improvements, 
but the developing countries’ results suggested that RES’ implementation could sabotage the 
economy. And finally, ANS, which proved to be very consistently benefitting from RES’ share 
increase in the first group, while at the same time renewables brought mixed outcomes to 
developing countries’ total amount of savings. The circumstances enlisted above bring us to the 
next finding. 
II – Timing matters: the brown growth and the black growth economies are on different 
timelines in terms of their ability to effectively increase RES’ share in TPES.  
Coming back to the results of the correlation tests conducted (figures 3.4, 3.9 & 3.13), 
an upward trend was discovered by the research which, not only gives credit to RES’s 
influential ability on the economy, but reveals that developments happen, but at different times. 
With each one of the indicators tested, there was an obvious trend running through the sample 
frame, where the black growth economies were almost always lagging 5-15 years behind the 
brown growth economies. Such was the case when between the years of 2000-2017 the brown 
economies RES/GDP correlation ‘climbed’ from a moderate negative to a very weak positive 
value – a result with resemblance to the developed World in the beginning of the century. It 
was a similar case with EI, where a negative correlation between RES and EI at the beginning 
of the century turned to report no correlation and, in one instance, a positive correlation in the 
period of 2011-2017.  
A similar phenomenon, but in the opposite direction, was also noticed on the developed 
countries’ sample frames. In both, GDP & EI cases, the developed countries’ economies were 
in 2000-2005 benefitting from RES implementation, but this positive effect waned by 2011-
2017, resulting in disassociation between the variables (figures 3.4 & 3.9).  
The case can be made that the position on the respective timelines is equal to the development 
level of the economies. For the developing countries, purchase of expensive RES technologies 
in 2000-2005 took away from investments for other sectors, including energy efficiency and 
energy reduction solutions (Zehner, 2012), which are ingredients of EI. On the other hand, 
decreased costs of renewable energy generation could have removed the negative effect this 
variable had on the developing economies (IRENA, 2019b, Pollin, 2018). Finally, to explain 
the loss of RES’s influence on GDP and EI in the case of the developed world, a new thesis for 
research for another time is stated: when technology (e.g. RES) achieves maturity, its positive 
influence on a developed economy decreases. 
III – RES share increase in TPES does not encourage unsustainable expansion of the economy.  
The RES industry has been criticised for having motives no different to other capitalistic 
industries – the goal is to always expand the demand, consequently, the economy (Zehner, 
2012). The results of the correlation tests which were carried out on GDP (figure 3.4 & 3.5) 
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showed something different. While renewables’ increase in TPES of the developed countries 
marginally expanded the economy in 2000-2005, then during all the other periods (incl. the 
values of the developing states) the increase in share of RES showed disassociation or even 
negative correlation with GDP growth. For this reason, based on the empirical analysis 
conducted, this paper opposes Zehner’s statement. 
IV – RES increase does benefit the economy. 
The conclusion of the previous point about economic expansion does not mean that RES 
increase in TPES will not help the economy. On the contrary, the findings of this research are, 
that if the economy is measured with an indicator that takes into account elements of 
sustainability - meaning that the aggregate should be able to make distinctions between 
environmentally harmful and harmless activities (Harris, 2010), then increased use of 
renewable energy does benefit the economy. The indicator that had the best resemblance to an 
‘angelised’ GDP (Daly, 1973) was ANS (Adjusted Net Worth), which consistently, and with 
an increasing trend, showed positive weak or moderate correlation with RES. Put differently, 
at any moment when renewable energy’s share in a country’s energy portfolio increases, the 
total savings amount of its economy will have a tendency to increase. This applies to both, the 
brown growth and the black growth economies. 
Thinking retrospectively of the method and techniques used in this empirical analysis, few 
improvements are recommended for the work. Firstly, the values of the indicators could have 
been better standardised, or, in a couple instances, used in a different format. For example, the 
comparison of EU’s total RES’ versus EU’s RES-E (electricity sector only) results delivered 
inexplicably contrasting values. The difference could have been caused by the use of different 
databases (Eurostat & OECD), which have collected and worked on the data using different 
methodology. 
Secondly, in addition to correlating the values based on the total change, it is advised to consider 
also correlation calculations based on the speed of growth of the indicators. For example, if 
RES percentage in TPES changed during a certain period from 0.5 to 1 percentage, then the 
total change is 0.5, but the rate of growth is 100%. Both of the versions were used for this work, 
but the results were limited down to the first option (total change) only to keep the analysis 
compact. 
Finally, but not concluding the list, the research could have offered more depth in terms of the 
background information on the sample frames, which would have possibly revealed other 
variables that might be affecting the RES’ industry or the global economy. For example, the 
sample frame of BRIICSZ showed occasionally a fairly strong negative correlation between 
RES’ increase in TPES and GDP (also EI) values’ total growth percentages. The theory 
connected to this phenomenon was that the developing economies were not ready at the specific 
point of time for expensive RES’ technologies, but there, if analysed deeper, could have been 
political influences, like the rule of oligarchs in Russia for example. 
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Summary 
 
This paper was written with the purpose to prove that an increase of in renewable energy 
sources in a modern state’s energy portfolio brings it economical success. Leaning on multiple 
alternative economic progress measuring theories (Victor, 2010; Harris 2013; Daly, 1973), the 
author expected also to discover if renewable energy increase (RES) in total primary energy 
supply (TPES) affects countries on different development scale, and with a different GHGs 
emissions reducing track record, differently. Therefore, the economic variables included in the 
research along the widely used GDP, were energy intensity (EI) and adjusted net savings 
(ANS). 
To support the aim of the research, two statistical correlation equations were introduced: 
Pearson’s r and Spearman’s ρ. These coeficients measure correlation between two variables on 
the same scale of values, but because of a high variance of some of the constructed sample 
frames with influential outliers, use of both was necessary. To be honest, in some cases, neither 
of the coefficients’ results looked realistic, since their values were unexpectedly in the opposite 
sides of the negative-positive correlation scale. 
The selection of the countries to the sample frames were made with an intention to distinct the 
developed and the developing World from each other. The outcome was four groups: the EU, 
the OECD, authors created ‘BRIICSZ’ and the LDCs (the least developed countries), with the 
last two representing the developing part of the World, creating a valuable space for deeper 
research. 
The empirical analysis was divided into two parts. In the first part a trial test based on P. Victor’s 
(2010) theory on black, brown and green growth economies was conducted to create an 
overview of the GHG track record of the selected groups of countries. The results showed that 
while the developed world’s GHG emissions decrease and GDP increases (brown growth 
economy), then almost all of the developing countries have GDP and GHG emissions increasing 
simultaneously (black growth). 
The following correlation tests between RES share increase and the dependent indicators (GDP, 
EI and ANS) were carried through on 4 different timelines and in total of 96 times between the 
3 economic aggregates. Since there was an expectation that the correlation results will not be 
returning strong values, the author picked a strategy of counting multiple weak correlation 
values instead of looking for a single strong test result, to reveal the direction of effect 
renewables have on the economies. On the contrary, and unexpectedly, RES increase showed 
no correlation with GDP growth, but correlated at a reasonable strength with EI and ANS. 
The conclusion of the research highlighted four meaningful findings. First of all, this paper 
emphasizes that renewable energy does not have the same effect on the developing and the 
developed countries – much depends on the maturity level of the economy and the technology 
available to be implemented.  
Secondly, and tightly connected to the previous finding, it was discovered that the developing 
countries are almost always lagging behind the developed world by 10-20 years. Therefore, an 
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RES technology that would bring economic value today in the EU, would be reasonable for a 
developing country to be implemented in 10 or 20 years time. Meanwhile, it would be more 
effective for the latter to invest in solutions that increase energy efficiency, thus also decreases 
EI, creating value for the economy. 
The third important finding of the correlation tests conducted, was that renewable energy does 
not expand the economy. That’s because around 80% of the sample frames returned a non-
positive correlation between the two variables. This also refutes the criticism that RES industry 
is unsustainable. 
And finally and most importantly, this thesis proved that when the economy is measured with 
economic indicators, which consider the environment as an asset, like ANS does, then any kind 
of an RES increase in TPES, would benefit the economy. ANS is not perfect, but since it 
measures savings - how much money is in the bank, compared to revenue (GDP) - the ability 
to make money, then at the end of the day, the wealthiest and most prosperous is the nation that 
has invested the most. With this, the research confirmed the thesis that implementation of 
renewable energy is beneficial for the economy. 
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Appendices 
 
1.1 Appendice 1 – List of Countries in LDC’s Sample Frame. 
 GDP/capita (constant 2010 US$) GDP Growth in period 
Country Name 1999 2015 2000-2015 
Niger 339.4230965 386.3045326 14% 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 319.562059 411.0205731 29% 
Ethiopia 191.5718802 482.6390663 152% 
Mozambique 293.6128273 529.0910577 80% 
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Togo 551.034792 630.3045049 14% 
Haiti 762.19692 729.1196298 -4% 
Nepal 436.5597065 731.9993357 68% 
Benin 676.3366434 827.8354579 22% 
Tanzania 511.9469364 871.9983686 70% 
Yemen, Rep. 1132.388712 908.7578459 -20% 
Tajikistan 389.5968509 935.9998251 140% 
Bangladesh 508.3852227 1002.388853 97% 
Kyrgyz Republic 628.0693228 1019.876971 62% 
Cambodia 398.2881864 1024.621365 157% 
Pakistan 812.2556105 1082.766564 33% 
Kenya 837.4118776 1093.13417 31% 
Zimbabwe 1502.199532 1234.103352 -18% 
Myanmar 304.3025442 1335.203872 339% 
Senegal 1105.379407 1383.167206 25% 
Cameroon 1135.525814 1440.3788 27% 
Cote d'Ivoire 1420.32213 1462.283922 3% 
Ghana 940.9334409 1624.769624 73% 
Zambia 937.9458819 1641.005482 75% 
Vietnam 724.479783 1667.171891 130% 
India 810.2172832 1751.664378 116% 
Uzbekistan 955.9909703 1831.322908 92% 
Nicaragua 1262.723642 1835.999 45% 
Sudan 983.4368029 1869.552756 90% 
Honduras 1539.96832 2052.972454 33% 
Moldova 1135.817658 2355.700918 107% 
Bolivia 1592.737415 2361.056581 48% 
Nigeria 1350.983834 2563.148864 90% 
Philippines 1572.891447 2605.493599 66% 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1898.636374 2703.742092 42% 
Ukraine 1699.517473 2828.88539 66% 
Congo, Rep. 2333.57998 3009.600686 29% 
Guatemala 2522.828312 3069.041335 22% 
Morocco 1962.993308 3222.054178 64% 
Jordan 2772.165598 3275.272194 18% 
El Salvador 2655.466164 3314.699221 25% 
Sri Lanka 1732.378655 3647.393421 111% 
Angola 2201.52946 3748.320623 70% 
Kosovo 1915.320297 3802.393915 99% 
Indonesia 2071.524683 3824.274885 85% 
Mongolia 1596.469382 3895.413362 144% 
Armenia 1317.739791 3923.716502 198% 
Georgia 1573.159649 3964.510046 152% 
Tunisia 2895.015642 4308.415597 49% 
Albania 2085.432 4524.684565 117% 
Jamaica 4656.620622 4713.647102 1% 
Algeria 3474.215313 4776.787543 37% 
Author’s created      Source: World Bank 
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